Fasttoken Investigated: Control, Allocation & Centralisation

Fasttoken Unmasked: An Investigative Analysis of Control, Allocation and Structural Centralisation!

How the ecosystem behind FTN concentrates value, limits access and raises unanswered questions about decentralisation. This publication began with a simple question: who really controls Fasttoken?

In early 2024, Fasttoken (FTN) began gaining visibility as a token designed for digital payments and Web3 gaming. Promoted heavily through affiliated platforms, including Fastex and SoftConstruct, the token appeared to offer a decentralised solution built for community access and open participation. However, as we began to review the on-chain data, token allocations and structural disclosures, a more complicated and troubling picture began to emerge.

This is not a commentary on market volatility, token price movements or speculative trades. It is a detailed, investigative report into the foundational structure of the FTN ecosystem, who holds the majority of tokens, how they move and whether the promises made to the public match the reality recorded on-chain.

The questions raised are not theoretical. They are legal, operational and reputational. They concern concentration of value, access to liquidity and the ability of a small group of related actors to shape the market while retaining control over the tools of distribution and exchange. In conventional financial systems, this level of control would prompt oversight. In decentralised systems, it often escapes scrutiny.

Every claim in this report is based on verifiable evidence. Where interpretations are offered, they are presented cautiously and without assumption of misconduct. Throughout the drafting process, relevant individuals and corporate stakeholders were contacted and given the opportunity to provide comment, clarification or rebuttal. At the time of writing, no formal response has been received.

The goal of this article is not to discredit blockchain technology or its potential. It is to examine whether Fasttoken, as currently designed and distributed, reflects the principles it claims to uphold. Readers are invited to draw their own conclusions.

What follows is a multi-part examination of Fasttoken’s tokenomics, private distributions, wallet activity and structural proximity to Fastex and the broader SoftConstruct empire. At the centre of this network sit the founders, Vigen and Vahe Badalyan, whose influence across the project remains consistent and significant.

This report is published in the public interest. It is designed to support regulatory dialogue, investor education and responsible reporting in a space often clouded by marketing language and inaccessible technical detail.

Introduction to Fasttoken

Fasttoken (FTN) is not a project that emerged quietly. It arrived with full promotional force, marketed as the “official cryptocurrency of the Fastex ecosystem” and designed to serve as a foundational asset across payment platforms, iGaming products, NFT marketplaces and Web3 utilities. It was created and deployed by SoftConstruct, the Armenian technology firm best known for its BetConstruct gaming infrastructure and publicly associated with the Badalyan brothers, Vigen and Vahe.

From the start, FTN positioned itself as a decentralised and community-centric token, part of a wider ecosystem that promised efficiency, scalability and fairness. With bold claims about revolutionising digital assets for real-world utility, Fasttoken was offered to the public through public sale announcements, whitepapers and extensive marketing campaigns across both crypto and gambling industry platforms.

But the technical documents told only part of the story. Beyond the polished brand assets and ecosystem diagrams lay a structure that, upon closer inspection, appeared to follow a very different logic. One that concentrated control rather than decentralising it. One that benefitted insiders over retail participants. And one that seemed more designed to serve existing corporate interests than to foster genuine community ownership.

At the time of writing, Fasttoken operates as the primary token within Fastex, a platform also owned and controlled by the same group that designed the token itself. This proximity between issuer and market venue would raise immediate regulatory questions in any traditional financial context. In the crypto world, however, such arrangements are often overlooked, especially when dressed in the language of innovation.

This chapter sets the stage for a deeper examination of the FTN ecosystem. It outlines how the token was introduced, who stood behind it and how the public narrative diverges from on- chain facts. In doing so, it opens the path for a more grounded discussion about governance, liquidity and influence in a token economy that remains largely shielded from external scrutiny.

Fasttoken is often described as the key to unlocking a broad and inclusive future for online payments and digital interaction. Yet from its earliest days, the project carried the signature traits of a system built around centralised incentives. Whether by design or by outcome, it has reinforced existing hierarchies rather than challenging them.

The chapters that follow will demonstrate this pattern in greater detail. They will examine the actual distribution of FTN, the flow of tokens between internal and external wallets and the observable patterns that suggest a carefully managed structure rather than an organically growing ecosystem. They will also explore the legal and reputational consequences of such a setup, particularly in light of growing global scrutiny on token-based fundraising and corporate governance in crypto markets.

A public sale in name only

Fasttoken’s official documentation claims a total token supply of 1 billion FTN. Of this amount, just 10 percent was allocated to what the project terms “public and ecosystem access.” This includes the public sale itself, along with a range of user-facing campaigns and community incentives. Once these additional programmes are removed from the equation, the portion of FTN actually sold to the public becomes even smaller.

Public sale records show that only 10 million tokens were offered through the official FTN launch event. That amounts to just 1 percent of total supply. This figure stands in sharp contrast to the project’s decentralised branding and user-first messaging. It also places Fasttoken at the extreme end of token concentration compared to other blockchain-based projects with similar ambitions.

The remaining 90 percent of tokens were allocated to internal reserves, partner companies, early investors and team members. These allocations include 80 million FTN for Private Round 1 participants and 100 million FTN for Private Round 2. Both of these sales occurred behind closed doors, without open access or public documentation of buyers.

Some of the wallets associated with these rounds have since received matching on-chain transfers. The largest single transaction, a transfer of 100,218,957 FTN, corresponds exactly with the Private Round 2 allocation.

This wallet continues to move large volumes of FTN across the network, often in identical denominations and with no clear end recipient. Whether this wallet belongs to an investor or is controlled by a corporate treasury remains unconfirmed.

This raises questions about the visibility of Fasttoken’s true ownership structure. Public buyers, based on available data, were never positioned to influence or challenge the balance of power. Instead, they entered a system already dominated by internal stakeholders.

No clear evidence has been provided that vesting conditions or lock-up periods have been enforced. While the official tokenomics mention such terms, on-chain data reveals no obvious barriers preventing movement from the initial recipient wallets.

In many cases, those wallets have remained active and appear to continue redistributing tokens without restriction.

If decentralisation was the goal, this allocation model failed to deliver it. The public sale appears more symbolic than structural. It gave Fasttoken the appearance of a community- driven project, while leaving nearly all meaningful control in the hands of a few.

The decision to allocate such a small fraction of supply to open market participants has shaped the ecosystem’s trajectory ever since.

Controlled wallets and the illusion of liquidity

One of the strongest indicators of a decentralised ecosystem is the diversity and independence of its token holders. In the case of Fasttoken, on-chain analysis presents a very different picture. Instead of a wide network of individual wallets interacting through a dynamic marketplace, much of the token activity appears concentrated within a limited group of addresses.

Many of these wallets are either directly labelled as “Fastex” or show clear transactional patterns that suggest internal control.

Some of these wallets receive tokens in high-volume batches, then distribute them in repeating quantities of 499,999 or 1,000,000 FTN. These transfers often loop back to other known Fastex-related wallets or remain within a closed group of recurring addresses.

This type of movement may resemble liquidity on the surface, but it fails to reflect genuine user demand or decentralised market activity.

In several cases, wallets labelled identically (for example, “Fastex 2”) appear across multiple blockchain addresses, all moving tokens back and forth with minimal variation. This duplication of labels creates a confusing public interface. It makes it nearly impossible to determine which wallets are user-held and which remain under central control.

It also raises questions about whether the ecosystem’s reported activity is designed to simulate circulation rather than enable it.

These patterns are not necessarily indicative of misconduct. It is possible that some of the wallets belong to affiliated partners, liquidity providers or technology vendors. However, in the absence of any public wallet registry and with no transparency over which addresses are linked to the founding team or corporate structures, observers are left to speculate.

This problem is amplified by the fact that Fastex (the primary trading venue for FTN) is itself owned and operated by the same group that created the token. When trading, listing and distribution all occur within the same ecosystem, the boundary between real market activity and internal reallocation becomes difficult to define.

The illusion of liquidity may have temporary marketing value. But in the long term, it erodes trust. Without clarity on how tokens are moving and who holds them, any claims to decentralisation or open access begin to lose credibility.

Fasttoken promotes itself as a bridge between gaming, payments and blockchain innovation. Yet the ecosystem it has built operates more like a walled garden than an open marketplace.

Controlled wallets, repeated transaction patterns and internally managed venues do not support a decentralised economy. They maintain a closed one.

Anonymity, governance and missing accountability

Fasttoken was introduced with the promise of decentralised governance. Like many token- based projects, it promoted the idea that stakeholders would eventually have a say in how the ecosystem evolves.

In practice, however, no functioning governance structure has been made public. There is no accessible mechanism for holders to propose or vote on changes. No token-based DAO exists and no roadmaps have been published indicating when or how this layer of participation might be introduced.

This absence is particularly striking given the scale of assets involved. With a total supply of 1 billion FTN and vast quantities retained by company-linked wallets, the need for credible governance is not a secondary issue. It is central to legitimacy.

Without transparent procedures and enforceable checks on decision-making, the entire project becomes indistinguishable from a centralised platform wrapped in Web3 branding.

Most wallets remain unlabelled. The identities of private round participants, major token recipients and operational managers have not been disclosed. This lack of transparency is not unusual in the crypto industry, but it becomes more concerning when paired with centralised control and overlapping corporate ties. In such a structure, the absence of public disclosures does not just limit oversight, it conceals influence.

The centralisation of control within Fasttoken is mirrored in the broader Fastex ecosystem. Fastex Commerce, Fastex Exchange and Fastexverse all form part of a vertically integrated system developed by SoftConstruct. Public-facing documentation refers to this as a unified solution for digital commerce and decentralised finance. But with no separate governance between these layers, all key decisions appear to revert back to the same corporate centre.

No formal audit reports have been published detailing the allocation or flow of FTN. Token burns, large-scale transfers and wallet activity have occurred without explanation. One notable example is the destruction of 120 million FTN, sent to the null address without accompanying announcements or governance confirmation.

Whether this was a legitimate burn or a cosmetic operation remains unanswered.

There is also no sign that any regulator has evaluated FTN’s governance or compliance structure. The project operates across multiple jurisdictions, but has not clarified whether its token model is subject to oversight under financial or gaming regulations.

This silence, combined with the lack of internal governance, leaves the project in a grey area.

Fasttoken may continue to present itself as decentralised. But in the absence of actual governance and accountability, such a claim is not merely aspirational, it may be structurally misleading.

Treasury activity and selective transparency

One of the more overlooked aspects of Fasttoken’s operational design is the way treasury allocations are handled. While the published tokenomics mention a treasury reserve, no further detail is provided about its composition, function or policy framework. Despite its centrality to the long-term sustainability of the project, the treasury operates without any visible structure, defined mandate or oversight.

Wallets believed to be connected to treasury holdings have received substantial inflows since launch. In several cases, these wallets distribute FTN in large blocks to other addresses that do not appear to be retail or exchange accounts. The lack of identifiable wallet ownership makes it difficult to distinguish between legitimate operational disbursement and internal reallocation between affiliated parties.

In traditional finance, a treasury is subject to strict control procedures and disclosure obligations. Public companies must detail how reserves are allocated, under what terms they are accessed and who is authorised to execute transactions. Fasttoken, by contrast, presents no such disclosures. The result is a reserve system where tokens may be moved at discretion, with no way for outside observers to verify purpose or beneficiary.

Some of the most significant treasury-related movements involve wallets that also receive funds from private round allocations. In one instance, a single wallet was credited with over 100 million FTN, matching the full allocation for Private Round 2. That same wallet has since interacted with what appear to be internal addresses, raising the possibility that private and treasury flows may be partially intertwined.

The lack of separation between these components contributes to a perception that the ecosystem is designed around a central decision-making body rather than a decentralised process. When treasury, partner and investor wallets show overlapping activity and when those activities are neither disclosed nor explained, transparency becomes optional rather than foundational.

Fasttoken has not committed to any form of public treasury reporting. No quarterly breakdowns, no audit summaries and no wallet tagging initiatives have been launched to assist external verification. In some cases, the same wallet address has been used for both distribution and collection, further confusing the flow of tokens and making analysis dependent on circumstantial patterns rather than clear attribution.

This selective approach to transparency is unlikely to satisfy future regulatory requirements. It also fails to meet the expectations of decentralised finance participants, who increasingly demand accountability not just from exchanges and protocols but from token issuers themselves. Without structural separation and ongoing disclosures, the Fasttoken treasury cannot be considered a public resource. It remains a private one, concealed within an opaque ecosystem.

Vesting schedules and the imbalance of access

Fasttoken’s published tokenomics outline a number of allocations reserved for different stakeholders: team members, strategic partners, advisors and early investors. Alongside these allocations, vesting schedules are referenced, often with timelines suggesting gradual unlocks over periods of 12 to 36 months. On paper, this seems to offer a degree of fairness and discipline, limiting the immediate impact of large holders on market liquidity.

But on-chain data tells a more complex story.

Several wallets tied to private round allocations show no visible restrictions in their activity. High-volume transfers from these addresses began shortly after the token launch, including multi-million FTN movements that suggest active use, not long-term holding. There is no evidence of automated vesting contracts. Instead, the appearance is one of discretionary transfers, initiated manually and without any visible reference to a smart contract-based release schedule.

This raises questions about how and to whom, these tokens were distributed. If the vesting terms are not enforced on-chain, then the control resides entirely with the issuer. That allows for early investors or insiders to access liquidity ahead of schedule, undermining the stated terms and exposing retail participants to undisclosed risk.

Furthermore, there is no standard identifier applied to these wallets. While public documents mention the existence of vesting periods, they do not disclose the addresses under those conditions. This makes it impossible for the public to monitor whether such conditions are being met, or whether preferential treatment is being extended behind the scenes.

In a decentralised ecosystem, the community would typically be granted visibility over such data. Vesting wallets would be marked. Unlock events would be pre-announced. Any deviation from the original schedule would be subject to community oversight or at least public explanation. Fasttoken has offered none of these assurances.

This imbalance of access contributes to a broader structural problem. When public buyers are exposed to a token whose largest holders may have already secured early liquidity, the fundamental integrity of the project is compromised. It creates a two-tiered system, where those closest to the issuer operate with flexibility while others remain unaware of internal conditions.

Transparency around vesting is not a cosmetic feature. It is one of the core safeguards against insider advantage in tokenised economies. Fasttoken’s failure to publish verifiable vesting mechanisms or link them to on-chain activity places retail participants in a position of fundamental disadvantage.

Without clarity, fairness remains a claim, not a condition.

Exchange concentration and the illusion of liquidity

A token’s trading environment plays a critical role in shaping perceptions of credibility, market demand and accessibility. In the case of Fasttoken, much of the trading volume is concentrated on Fastex Exchange, a platform owned and operated by the same parent group that created FTN.

While this may offer convenience and integration, it raises difficult questions about independence, liquidity and fair price discovery.

Unlike decentralised exchanges (DEXs), where users trade peer to peer and transactions are recorded transparently on-chain, Fastex operates as a centralised exchange. It holds custody of user funds, matches orders internally and sets the pace and visibility of trading activity.

When the issuer of a token also controls the platform where most of its trading occurs, the risk of artificial volume or unverified market dynamics increases significantly.

Although FTN is also listed on third-party exchanges such as Gate.io and MEXC, available liquidity and order depth on those platforms remain limited. Order book snapshots often reveal thin trading volumes, with sharp differences between buy and sell side liquidity. In such conditions, large transactions may cause outsized price shifts, making the token unattractive to institutional traders or cautious retail participants.

Moreover, the lack of decentralised exchange listings limits the options for trustless trading. FTN is not broadly available on established DEXs like Uniswap or PancakeSwap, nor is there evidence of liquidity pools backed by the founding entity. This absence restricts user autonomy and consolidates trading control within a small circle of entities closely aligned with the token issuer.

This structure does not resemble an open financial ecosystem. It reflects a closed-loop model, where token issuance, listing, market-making and user interface are controlled under one brand. While such an approach can streamline user experience, it removes the checks and balances that decentralisation was intended to guarantee.

Liquidity on paper is not the same as real liquidity. Without diverse participation, meaningful volume and transparent settlement, a token’s market becomes performative rather than functional. If price stability and trading confidence are dependent on internal actors, the result is not an open market but a curated display.

Fasttoken continues to report high daily volumes on selected exchanges. However, without independent verification, deep liquidity and decentralised trading options, these figures may reflect internal balancing rather than external demand.

In such a scenario, the illusion of liquidity may serve to attract new entrants whose participation is used to reinforce a centralised structure rather than open it up.

Circular transactions and misleading flows

One of the more persistent patterns emerging from on-chain analysis of Fasttoken’s ecosystem is the presence of circular transactions. These are token transfers that appear to move value between different wallets but ultimately return to the original source, either directly or via a small network of intermediaries.

In blockchain terms, this behaviour is not inherently unlawful or indicative of wrongdoing, but it often reveals structural attempts to simulate movement, inflate perceived activity or obscure true ownership.

Multiple wallets associated with Fasttoken, including those tagged as “Fastex 2”, demonstrate repetitive behaviour. Tokens are sent out in uniform amounts, often in sequences of 499,999 FTN or similar, then received again by the same wallet or by another that displays the same naming convention. Some of these addresses appear to belong to internal systems or reserves, while others remain unlabelled.

The recurring pattern of identical transaction amounts suggests automation. These are not user-triggered transfers from ordinary retail holders. They resemble programmed wallet flows, often executed at regular intervals, with no interaction with third-party exchange accounts or KYC-based platforms.

This raises several concerns.

Firstly, circular flows distort transactional visibility. When activity is concentrated among internal wallets, it becomes difficult for external observers to differentiate between genuine network adoption and backend movement. An increase in transactions might be misread as rising user engagement when, in reality, it is simply operational reshuffling.

Secondly, these patterns can influence perceptions of liquidity. Wallets that appear active may, in fact, be locked in a loop with no real exposure to public markets. If these tokens are then reported as part of liquidity reserves or available supply, the market view becomes unreliable. For projects that claim decentralised principles, such opacity undermines user trust.

Lastly, circular flows often emerge when projects attempt to maintain appearances during low demand periods. By keeping tokens moving, even internally, the ecosystem gives the impression of momentum. But blockchain records are immutable and patterns eventually tell their own story. In Fasttoken’s case, the story is one of rotation rather than distribution.

A decentralised economy relies on transparency, not just in code but in conduct. When value moves in circles, it may be a signal that growth is not organic. It may also indicate that tokens remain largely in the hands of their creators, circulating only within the parameters they control. Without clear explanations for these patterns, the public must rely on inference. And that inference increasingly points to centralised orchestration behind the scenes.

The burn address and the question of supply manipulation

Burning tokens is often promoted as a mechanism to reduce supply and enhance scarcity, potentially benefiting existing holders. In transparent token economies, burns are typically governed by pre-announced rules, executed through verifiable smart contracts and supported by public disclosures.

In Fasttoken’s case, however, the situation appears far less straightforward.

On-chain analysis reveals that two separate transfers of exactly 60 million FTN each were made to the null address, the standard method for permanently removing tokens from circulation. These transactions were initiated from a wallet connected to internal treasury activity and represent a substantial portion of the total supply.

Taken together, they constitute 12 percent of the original 1 billion token supply.

Yet, no official explanation or statement accompanied these transactions. There is no whitepaper amendment, no update in the tokenomics and no evidence of a governance proposal or vote. In the absence of such context, these burns may appear cosmetic, or worse, strategic manoeuvres to mask other distribution dynamics.

The decision to burn 120 million FTN without public discussion raises fundamental questions. Was this a supply correction in response to over-allocation? Was it part of a broader liquidity strategy aimed at rebalancing perceived scarcity? Or was it simply an exercise in optics, designed to present Fasttoken as more deflationary than it actually is?

In well-regulated financial environments, actions affecting asset supply are subject to rigorous oversight. Even in decentralised ecosystems, there is growing expectation for community governance or at minimum transparent communication. Fasttoken’s unilateral approach to supply reduction deviates from both principles.

It is also notable that no audit or independent verification has been published to confirm the burn. The tokens are visible in the null address, but the provenance, intention and impact remain opaque. Without further information, it is not possible to rule out scenarios where identical quantities could have been allocated elsewhere, or where burns serve more to adjust perception than economics.

The absence of a clear deflationary model weakens Fasttoken’s claim to decentralised governance. In a functioning ecosystem, the removal of tokens from circulation would not be a discretionary act, but a community-sanctioned process. When it happens without explanation, it invites scepticism rather than trust.

Burning tokens may reduce the visible supply, but it cannot erase the accountability required for such action. Without transparent reasoning, even a burn of 120 million FTN adds more confusion than clarity to an already opaque token model.

Governance gaps and the myth of decentralised control

One of the defining claims of the Fasttoken ecosystem is its positioning as a decentralised infrastructure built for users, developers and operators alike. Yet, beneath the language of empowerment and participation lies a governance structure that appears almost entirely centralised.

There is no visible governance portal where holders can submit or vote on proposals. No record of community consultations. No evidence of any form of participatory decision-making process for matters as crucial as token burns, ecosystem grants or listings. In practice, Fasttoken is not governed by its community. It is governed by its creators.

This governance vacuum creates a significant imbalance. Tokens are distributed with vesting schedules and marketing plans, yet the community has no formal avenue to question or amend those plans. Those holding FTN in the hope of influencing the project’s direction may find that their rights are limited to holding or selling. No voting. No proposals. No voice.

The absence of on-chain governance is particularly concerning given the scale of internal control. Wallets tied to the original minting address still hold hundreds of millions of tokens. With no checks or balances, those wallets can move, lock, stake or even burn tokens without scrutiny. This concentration of power is not theoretical. It is observable.

Most decentralised projects seek to build credibility through transparency and progressive decentralisation. That process often includes multi-signature treasury wallets, published governance frameworks and regular audits of core decision-making. Fasttoken, by contrast, offers none of these.

Even basic measures such as regular community updates, financial disclosures or third-party verifications are missing from the Fasttoken ecosystem. Its documentation refers to goals and milestones, but without any enforceable framework or metrics for accountability. In effect, holders are asked to trust the goodwill of a central group of operators, many of whom maintain ties to privately held companies under the same ownership.

This centralisation is compounded by the fact that trading, staking and wallet infrastructure are largely operated through Fastex and other affiliated platforms. As a result, Fasttoken’s environment lacks both internal democracy and external neutrality.

A decentralised system without governance is not simply incomplete. It is misleading. When the appearance of user involvement is not matched by actual influence, the project risks becoming a closed system that speaks the language of blockchain while operating on entirely conventional lines.

Until these governance gaps are addressed, Fasttoken remains a centralised network wrapped in decentralised branding.

Lack of regulatory clarity and disclosure

Fasttoken presents itself as a utility token operating within a broader digital commerce and gaming ecosystem. While this framing helps avoid the language of investment or speculation, it does not exempt the project from the rising expectations of regulatory transparency across jurisdictions.

Nowhere on the official Fasttoken or Fastex websites is there a comprehensive legal disclaimer or regulatory position that outlines how the project is classified, what licences (if any) are held, or which jurisdiction governs the issuance of the token.

This lack of basic disclosure is increasingly problematic in an environment where both crypto projects and the platforms that host them are expected to adhere to anti-money laundering, consumer protection and financial services frameworks.

It is unclear whether Fasttoken was issued under the supervision of any recognised financial authority. No references are made to the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA), the Gibraltar Financial Services Commission (GFSC), or the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). This omission becomes especially relevant when the token is promoted as part of a payments system, or when it is used within regulated sectors such as iGaming or financial technology.

More concerning still is the use of promotional language that borders on financial marketing. The token’s public materials reference growth potential, ecosystem value and reward mechanisms, all of which may cross into the territory of financial promotion. If Fasttoken is marketed to non-professional investors, but no investor protections are built into the offering, this raises questions about compliance with existing EU and UK laws.

The blurred lines between Fasttoken, Fastex, BetConstruct and SoftConstruct further complicate regulatory oversight. With no clear separation of roles or corporate entities, it becomes difficult to assess who the issuer is, who holds responsibility for disclosures and how legal accountability is structured. In many jurisdictions, this level of ambiguity would be unacceptable.

It is also not evident whether Fasttoken has been registered with any transparency registry such as the EU’s ESMA crypto asset notification framework or any form of regulatory sandbox. Without such declarations, users are left to assume a best-case scenario in terms of legal standing and investor rights.

The absence of these disclosures may not immediately breach legal obligations, depending on the country of issuance. However, in a market where trust and transparency are key differentiators, failing to provide even the most basic regulatory clarity signals either indifference to compliance or a calculated decision to operate in the shadows of enforceability.

Rebranding the ecosystem while retaining control

At first glance, the Fasttoken and Fastex ecosystem appears to represent a new digital frontier: decentralised finance, Web3 gaming and token-based payments converging into a unified vision. The branding is sharp, the terminology modern and the claims aspirational.

Yet when one steps back, it becomes increasingly clear that this ecosystem is less a decentralised innovation and more a strategic rebranding of an already centralised infrastructure.

Fastex, as the main marketplace and trading platform for Fasttoken, is fully controlled by the same operators behind SoftConstruct and BetConstruct. The payment rails, the staking mechanisms, the NFT platform and the validator system are all interlinked through proprietary services. This effectively removes the separation between issuer, platform and distribution channel, a distinction that is central to any claim of decentralisation.

The validator programme is a case in point. Described in documentation as an opportunity for external participants to support the network, it operates on an invitation-only basis, with no public interface for application, monitoring or audit. Without public delegation or independent oversight, the validators remain closely affiliated, if not directly appointed, by the founding team. This contradicts the typical principles of public blockchain infrastructure.

Similarly, Fasttoken’s presence on secondary exchanges like Gate.io or MEXC does not meaningfully alter this centralisation. Trading volume, token supply and liquidity remain concentrated within wallets and platforms operated or supervised by the project’s creators. The use of external listings seems to function more as a signal of legitimacy than as a structural change in control or distribution.

The branding around “ecosystem” participation also deserves scrutiny. Many promotional materials highlight opportunities for community members to engage, earn or build. Yet in practice, the tools, APIs and governance structures necessary for such participation are either closed-source, unverified or absent. This creates the appearance of openness while retaining strict control over access and functionality.

Taken together, these elements suggest that what Fasttoken and Fastex offer is not a decentralised ecosystem but a vertically integrated product suite, repackaged in blockchain terminology. The rebranding allows the operators to tap into investor enthusiasm for decentralised assets while maintaining the economic and administrative advantages of centralisation.

In corporate strategy, such repositioning is not unusual. But when it is done in the language of decentralisation (and offered to retail participants as a new paradigm of empowerment) it raises concerns about accuracy, fairness and intent. The infrastructure may be new, but the control structures remain firmly in familiar hands.

The illusion of price discovery

Fasttoken’s market valuation is often cited as a signal of success. Daily trading volumes above

$60 million have been reported on platforms like CoinGecko and price stability is referenced in marketing materials as a sign of investor confidence.

However, the mechanics behind this valuation deserve closer inspection. When examined in context, they reveal a structure that appears to limit true market-driven price discovery.

A critical factor is the centralisation of liquidity. The vast majority of FTN transactions occur on Fastex, a platform owned and operated by the same ecosystem promoting Fasttoken. Although FTN is listed on a handful of secondary exchanges such as MEXC and Gate.io, these venues show relatively low trading activity and often mirror the pricing visible on Fastex itself.

This suggests that price formation is not occurring through open competition between buyers and sellers, but through a system where the operators control both sides of the market.

There is also no evidence of substantial trading on decentralised exchanges. Unlike tokens that reach wide distribution through Ethereum or other public chains, FTN lacks sufficient visibility in open, permission less markets.

This prevents external actors from providing meaningful liquidity or arbitrage, which would normally help enforce fair pricing across platforms.

The lack of third-party market makers further compounds this issue. In traditional and decentralised finance alike, price discovery depends on participants who are willing to provide buy and sell orders based on demand, supply and risk exposure. When these roles are filled by insiders or related parties, the result is not price discovery but price maintenance.

Token liquidity also appears to be gated. Withdrawal and transfer limits vary across platforms and FTN transfers often pass through a handful of repeating wallet addresses that appear linked to internal systems.

This may allow the operators to manage flow, limit volatility or prevent large exits, but it also diminishes the independence of the token’s market.

Without a free-floating price, users cannot assess fair value. Without competition between exchanges, there is no meaningful arbitrage.

And without transparency on who provides liquidity and under what conditions, participants are left in a closed loop of pricing activity that may be more cosmetic than real.

In financial regulation, these structures would raise immediate concern. In decentralised finance, they often go unnoticed. Yet the risk remains the same: price signals without market integrity create an illusion of demand where little may exist.

Vesting mechanics that favour insiders

Fasttoken’s public documentation presents a structured tokenomics plan, complete with allocations for various stakeholders and timelines for vesting. On paper, this suggests a level of discipline and long-term planning.

But a closer look reveals that the vesting mechanisms appear to disproportionately favour insiders, while providing little protection or clarity for public participants.

Private Round 1 was allocated 80 million FTN and Private Round 2 received 100 million FTN. These rounds occurred before any public access to the token and the vesting conditions were never published in full. While summaries indicate certain lock-up periods and gradual releases, on-chain analysis shows that large volumes were transferred to individual wallets almost immediately after the token launch. These wallets, in turn, began distributing tokens in regular intervals, sometimes just days after receiving them.

One wallet, for example, received over 100 million FTN in a single transaction matching the exact allocation of Private Round 2. It has since shown consistent outflows of 499,999 FTN per transaction. There is no public record explaining the rationale behind these fixed denominations, nor any information on who controls the wallet.

If this represents a private investor, it raises questions about favourable terms. If it is a corporate reserve, it raises deeper questions about disclosure.

In contrast, the public sale allocation was capped at 10 million FTN, just 1% of the total supply. There is no evidence that retail buyers received any vesting privileges. The imbalance is stark. Insiders received vast allocations with flexible movement, while the public entered an already skewed market with no informational parity and no guaranteed protections.

The absence of a token vesting contract on-chain further complicates transparency. Many serious crypto projects deploy publicly viewable smart contracts to enforce vesting schedules and provide accountability. In Fasttoken’s case, most large transfers appear to be manually executed between internally labelled wallets, suggesting a lack of automation and an overreliance on trust.

When questioned, some projects argue that flexible vesting allows them to manage liquidity more effectively. However, when these controls are operated without external oversight or public explanation, the result is a distribution model where insiders can liquidate holdings gradually while maintaining control over market perception.

Such patterns may not violate any specific law, but they do fall short of the standards expected in both decentralised finance and traditional capital markets. The result is a structure where control, liquidity and timing are tools used not to ensure fairness, but to preserve advantage.

Wallet labelling and internal routing patterns

Transparency is a core promise of blockchain systems. Every transaction is traceable, every balance is visible and every token has a recorded history. But Fasttoken’s on-chain environment complicates that ideal. Instead of supporting clarity, the project’s wallet architecture appears to mask true flows of value through a maze of similarly labelled and internally linked addresses.

One example is the recurring use of wallet labels like “Fastex 2”. This name appears on several distinct wallet addresses, each engaging in different transaction patterns. In some cases, these wallets receive large sums of FTN only to redistribute them across other Fastex-labelled wallets in near-identical amounts. In others, the same address acts as both sender and recipient across different chains or routing paths.

Without clear ownership disclosures, this repetition of naming can give the false impression of ecosystem-wide activity when, in reality, value may simply be circulating within a closed loop.

A wallet receiving 36,864,000 FTN, for instance, conducted over 1,000 transactions, many in precise and repeating values. These transactions were not random. The patterns were structured and consistent; indicating scripted internal movement rather than user-driven demand. In other parts of the network, we see funds transferred from one wallet to another and then quickly returned, sometimes through an intermediary, with no identifiable economic purpose.

The absence of clarity around which wallets belong to insiders, team reserves or platform functions further blurs interpretation. Projects with a commitment to open governance typically publish a registry of internal addresses, including treasury accounts, developer allocations or vesting contracts. Fasttoken has not provided this transparency, making it difficult to distinguish legitimate decentralised activity from internal allocation management.

This lack of distinction creates problems. Observers may misinterpret internal transfers as market activity. Analysts may assume that token usage reflects adoption rather than balance reshuffling. And retail participants may mistakenly perceive deep liquidity or decentralised control where neither exists.

Moreover, the use of misleading or duplicative wallet labels erodes trust. The purpose of wallet labelling is to help the public track on-chain behaviour. When labels are applied inconsistently or in ways that obscure rather than illuminate, the result is narrative control rather than transparency.

In a decentralised system, routing patterns should reflect independent decision-making by market participants. In Fasttoken’s case, the patterns suggest coordination, control and opacity. These dynamics are not merely technical details. They speak to the very governance of the project and its willingness to subject itself to scrutiny.

The mystery of the 120 million FTN burn

Among the many on-chain events tied to Fasttoken, few are as opaque as the apparent burning of 120 million FTN. Two separate transactions sent 60 million FTN each to a null address (the standard destination for token burns) suggesting a supply reduction totalling 12% of the entire token supply.

But no official explanation, audit trail or governance record has been provided to clarify why this was done, who approved it or what long-term strategy it was intended to support.

In decentralised finance, token burns are often used to reduce supply and theoretically increase value for holders. But when conducted without public announcement or verification, these actions raise more questions than they answer. There was no Fasttoken blog post, no reference in whitepapers or tokenomics updates and no sign of community consultation prior to the execution of either burn.

This raises concerns about governance and internal control. Was the decision taken by a central team? Were these tokens truly removed from circulation, or could they have been sent from treasury reserves to a mislabelled internal address disguised as a burn?

While the null address is a recognised method for destroying tokens, only transparency and independent audit can confirm the legitimacy of such events.

Adding further complexity is the absence of any deflationary policy in Fasttoken’s official documentation. There is no stated goal of supply reduction, no roadmap target and no alignment between the timing of the burns and any key development milestones. If the intention was to create positive market sentiment or respond to liquidity issues, it was not communicated. If it was a technical error or a form of value obfuscation, it has never been corrected.

Burn events, especially those involving such high volumes, should be recorded in public governance frameworks, especially when the asset is marketed as part of a decentralised or Web3 ecosystem.

The fact that 120 million FTN could be destroyed, or appear to be destroyed, without a traceable decision-making process is inconsistent with the principles of blockchain accountability.

In isolation, this may appear to be a minor technical anomaly. But in the broader context of Fasttoken’s centralised structure, insider-heavy allocations and internal transfer patterns, the unexplained burn reinforces a wider pattern.

The pattern is one of discretion, not transparency. It signals that core decisions about token supply are made without public oversight, raising doubts about how much control is exercised by a select few and how little is left to the community.

Strategic silence and the lack of public clarification

Despite a growing list of irregularities across Fasttoken’s on-chain activity, token distribution and wallet behaviour, the project’s leadership has so far remained notably silent. This silence is not incidental. It appears to reflect a strategic choice to avoid public scrutiny while maintaining the outward appearance of community engagement and ecosystem development.

In traditional financial systems, a lack of public communication from senior management amid serious questions would trigger concern among investors, regulators and analysts. In decentralised projects, silence from leadership carries even more weight. It undermines the notion of shared governance and raises the possibility that key decisions are being made behind closed doors without community consultation or transparency.

Fasttoken’s own website, whitepapers and ecosystem documentation fail to address basic questions.

Which wallets are treasury-controlled? What is the vesting schedule for early investors? Who approved the token burns? How are ecosystem incentives distributed?

These are not unreasonable questions. They are the foundation of informed participation. Yet the absence of these answers allows the core team to operate without public accountability.

More concerning still is the lack of engagement with the broader crypto and compliance communities. Projects with genuine commitment to transparency often conduct audits, publish wallet registries and hold public AMAs or governance votes. Fasttoken has not provided a verified audit of circulating supply, nor has it confirmed whether its internal token activity is monitored by a third-party compliance firm. There is no indication of a plan to decentralise control or introduce external oversight mechanisms.

Silence can be powerful, but it can also be revealing. In this case, it suggests that the core entities behind Fasttoken are not willing to clarify key issues because doing so would expose structural imbalances or decisions inconsistent with the decentralised narrative. The longer these questions go unanswered, the more credible the concern becomes that the ecosystem is designed to shield rather than share control.

This pattern is not unique to Fasttoken. Many blockchain projects have relied on silence or ambiguity to obscure power dynamics. What makes this case different is the sheer volume of capital concentrated in a handful of wallets and the ongoing marketing push positioning Fasttoken as a public-facing asset.

When a project claims to be built for the community but refuses to engage with it transparently, the silence becomes a statement in itself. It may not confirm wrongdoing, but it certainly implies that scrutiny is not welcome. In a market built on trustless systems and verifiable records that implication should not be taken lightly.

Obfuscated labels and the illusion of activity

In any token ecosystem, clarity around wallet ownership and function plays a crucial role in building trust. With Fasttoken, however, the labelling of wallets appears to add confusion rather than clarity. A striking example is the repeated use of the label “Fastex 2” across multiple wallets, many of which are involved in high-frequency transfers between one another.

Rather than enhancing transparency, this repeated labelling blurs the lines between treasury holdings, operational addresses and potential internal liquidity loops.

Blockchain explorers such as Etherscan allow for address labelling that can help the public distinguish between user wallets, company reserves or third-party custody accounts. Yet in the Fasttoken ecosystem, the same label has been applied to at least three different addresses with no further detail.

These wallets do not share the same balance, purpose or transaction history. Despite this, each carries the same vague tag, “Fastex 2”, creating the impression that these wallets belong to a unified operational unit. On inspection, they do not behave that way.

One of the “Fastex 2” wallets appears to have received large amounts of FTN directly from the minting address. It then redistributed these tokens across dozens of smaller wallets, often in identical denominations of 500,000 FTN. Another wallet under the same label has been involved in more than 3,400 transactions, the majority of which simply move FTN in circles between internally connected addresses.

This does not resemble genuine user activity. It may suggest a system designed to simulate network movement without any corresponding market engagement.

To compound the issue, there is no formal registry from Fasttoken or Fastex identifying which wallets are under company control. This leaves analysts and users to rely on circumstantial inference based on flow patterns and address history. Such an approach may be sufficient for basic analysis, but it is wholly inadequate for a token that aspires to operate as a decentralised public utility.

Transparency is not simply about publishing whitepapers or promoting brand partnerships. It requires a willingness to reveal the mechanics of control and movement within the ecosystem.

In Fasttoken’s case, the use of identical labels across distinct addresses, combined with recursive transfers between them, presents an ecosystem designed for opacity.

Whether this design is intended to mislead, or simply reflects poor internal standards, remains unclear. What is clear is that such labelling practices make it more difficult for third parties to assess risk, track concentration or evaluate decentralisation claims.

That alone should give pause to any serious investor or partner.

Vesting logic – who benefits and when?

In the world of tokenomics, vesting schedules are intended to balance reward and responsibility. They aim to ensure that early contributors, investors or team members remain aligned with the long-term success of a project.

With Fasttoken, however, the vesting logic appears heavily tilted in favour of a select few, raising questions about the integrity of its incentive structure and the degree to which any real decentralisation exists at all.

According to the project’s official documentation, a significant portion of the FTN supply was allocated to private rounds and internal stakeholders, with vesting periods spanning from 6 months to 48 months. On the surface, this might appear standard. But when examined more closely, it becomes clear that the design permits extremely large allocations to become liquid relatively early in the project’s lifecycle.

Some wallets linked to these private rounds appear to have already begun moving sizeable amounts of FTN well before the broader ecosystem had matured.

The absence of a public, verifiable vesting contract on-chain compounds the problem. While the Fasttoken team has made general claims about lock-up periods, cliffs and gradual releases, these terms are not transparently enforced through smart contracts that third parties can inspect or verify. This means enforcement relies entirely on trust in the project’s administrators, who remain opaque in their communications and control key infrastructure.

More troubling is the observable pattern of large token batches being distributed in identical quantities from known treasury or strategic addresses. Rather than showing the hallmarks of staggered vesting schedules with defined logic, the on-chain activity suggests that multiple beneficiaries may be receiving tokens simultaneously in fixed intervals.

The uniformity of these movements raises doubts about whether the vesting claims made publicly are being followed in practice.

This is not a trivial issue. Projects with poorly implemented or selectively enforced vesting schedules risk undermining confidence, particularly in markets where insiders already dominate supply and control liquidity. It also raises the possibility that certain holders may have the option to exit positions earlier than the broader community had assumed, placing public participants at a structural disadvantage.

A fair vesting system builds stability. An obscure one fosters mistrust. In Fasttoken’s case, the absence of publicly auditable vesting mechanisms, combined with evidence of repetitive, large-scale movements from internal wallets, suggests a model that lacks the rigour expected from any project seeking long-term viability.

Until verifiable enforcement is made available, any claims of fairness or alignment with community interests should be viewed with caution.

Is this a decentralised ecosystem?

Fasttoken’s promotional materials repeatedly emphasise decentralisation. The language evokes familiar ideals: community governance, user empowerment and disintermediation. Yet the structure underpinning Fasttoken tells a very different story (one that places control) supply and decision-making power in the hands of a small, tightly connected group.

True decentralisation implies structural independence. It requires that no single entity (or affiliated group) can unilaterally shape the outcome of a system. With Fasttoken, however, ownership remains concentrated in wallets linked to SoftConstruct and Fastex, including multiple addresses connected directly or indirectly to the Badalyan family’s business network. The result is a token ecosystem that retains the appearance of decentralisation while operating under highly centralised conditions.

Critical components of the Fasttoken framework are closed or opaque. The Fastex exchange, where most liquidity resides, is owned by the same operators who issued the token. The treasury addresses that distribute FTN are not governed by a community mechanism but appear to follow internal logic invisible to the public. No formal DAO exists. No transparent governance structure has been deployed. No open community oversight has been implemented.

The use of identical wallet labels across multiple addresses adds to the confusion. Rather than supporting transparency, these naming practices obfuscate the distinction between individual actors and institutional holders. In some cases, wallets labelled “Fastex 2” transact directly with other “Fastex 2” wallets, creating the impression of movement while keeping tokens within the same operational umbrella. This undermines the principle of open ecosystems where token flow signals genuine user behaviour.

Even the published roadmap offers little assurance. While vague references are made to future decentralised governance or community development, there is no binding mechanism in place to ensure these milestones are achieved. In the absence of smart contract-enforced rules or third-party audits, these aspirations remain speculative.

This structure may offer efficiency, but it strips away the checks and balances that make decentralised ecosystems resilient. Users entering the Fasttoken network are not joining permission less, democratic infrastructure. They are interacting with a framework whose key variables are set and managed by insiders, with limited transparency and no enforceable accountability.

In that light, the core question becomes unavoidable: is Fasttoken truly decentralised, or is decentralisation being used as a brand rather than a principle?

Until independent governance structures are implemented and transparency improves significantly, Fasttoken cannot reasonably be described as a decentralised ecosystem. It may run on blockchain rails, but control remains firmly centralised.

Appendix: Summary of on-chain wallet activity

The on-chain movement of Fasttoken (FTN) paints a picture of internal coordination, structured disbursement and tightly held ownership that does not align with typical decentralised ecosystems. Through the course of this investigation, we analysed over a dozen wallets, some bearing system-generated identifiers, others assigned human-readable labels such as “Fastex 2” or “FTN Treasury.” The result is a clear pattern of highly centralised asset control with limited evidence of genuine, independent distribution to the wider market.

The most notable wallet in the ecosystem is the original minting address. This wallet was credited with the full supply of one billion FTN at genesis. From that point, it served as the core distribution point, transferring tokens to other internal wallets in large blocks. The most significant of these included a transfer of exactly 100,218,957 FTN, corresponding precisely with the allocation outlined in Fasttoken’s documentation for Private Round 2. This wallet remains active and retains more than 99 million FTN at the time of writing, suggesting either an extended lock-up schedule or controlled release not disclosed through any formalised governance mechanism.

Another major recipient wallet received 230 million FTN, split across multiple large transfers, including one in excess of 120 million FTN. The internal labelling or purpose of this wallet is unclear, though the concentration and size of holdings suggest it functions either as a treasury subdivision or an entity holding strategic reserves. Unlike community wallets, which tend to show large volumes of smaller transactions as users trade, stake or transfer their tokens, this address reflects minimal outbound flow. Most activity appears static or intra- network in nature.

Perhaps the most curious pattern observed was that of repeated outflows in uniform denominations. One wallet, which received 36,864,000 FTN, engaged in over 1,000 transactions, many of which involved identical values being transferred at regular intervals. These outflows often consisted of precisely 499,999 FTN and appeared to be sent to other internal addresses rather than public exchange wallets or user wallets with known interaction histories. This sort of repeated disbursement suggests internal testing, staged liquidity movement or programmed transfers designed to simulate organic activity without actually diversifying ownership.

The wallet cluster labelled Fastex 2 represents another focal point. Across multiple snapshots, the Fastex 2 label was found on more than one wallet address. In some cases, wallets with this name sent FTN to each other. In others, the same wallet received FTN from a differently numbered but similarly labelled source. This use of identical wallet names for multiple addresses raises issues around traceability and undermines the reliability of on-chain label- based transparency.

If multiple wallets are labelled identically, the ability of external observers to determine the true origin or destination of tokens is diminished. More significantly, it becomes difficult to distinguish whether tokens are leaving the ecosystem or merely circulating within it.

The broader impression given by these transactions is that a considerable volume of FTN remains trapped within a closed loop of internal wallets. These addresses interact with each other in high frequency but low diversity patterns, meaning that the number of unique counterparties is minimal. Many of these transfers are not accompanied by user engagement, smart contract interaction or external exchange events. The lack of activity with third-party DeFi protocols, decentralised exchanges or open staking pools is striking for a token that claims to be a core pillar of a next-generation Web3 ecosystem.

A further point of concern is the interaction between Fasttoken-linked wallets and addresses that have previously been flagged for suspicious activity. Notably, one wallet that received more than 173 million FTN has been identified in multiple block explorer databases as linked to the Alphapo Drainer label. This label emerged following the July 2023 breach of Alphapo, a centralised payment processor that was reportedly exploited for over $60 million in assets. The presence of such a label does not confirm wrongdoing on the part of Fasttoken or its associated entities. However, the movement of substantial volumes of FTN to this address from a known Fastex-labelled wallet raises legitimate questions about the due diligence applied when transacting at the treasury or ecosystem level.

Another anomaly uncovered in the wallet behaviour analysis is the existence of two transactions involving exactly 60 million FTN each being sent to the null address. These transfers are presumed to represent token burns, effectively removing them from circulation. However, the absence of any formal announcement, audit verification or timestamped commentary leaves this assumption open to scrutiny.

Most major token burns are communicated clearly to the public, with documentation provided to support transparency. In this case, no such supporting material has been disclosed. The lack of explanation may suggest an attempt to signal deflationary policy without the formal mechanisms to back it up, or potentially to obscure the true distribution status by removing large token blocks from visible supply.

It is also worth noting that no governance-based burn schedule or DAO proposal exists to formalise these decisions. This again reinforces the broader theme observed across the ecosystem: that core control remains centralised, with strategic decisions made off-chain and executed through proprietary channels without public input or record.

Throughout this on-chain audit, we found little evidence of meaningful engagement from independent holders or ecosystem participants. Wallets believed to be under the control of the Fasttoken operators continue to dominate both total supply and token velocity.

When user-facing transfers occur, they tend to follow highly regular patterns with consistent values, often into wallets that themselves conduct no further activity. In aggregate, the Fasttoken on-chain footprint reflects a system with internal symmetry but external opacity.

In conclusion, the on-chain data collected during this investigation does not support the narrative of a decentralised or community-oriented token economy. Instead, it reveals an architecture in which wallet activity is largely confined to known or labelled addresses, with minimal engagement from outside participants. Many wallets are high volume but low diversity in terms of counterparties. Multiple addresses appear to operate in coordination, some with identical labels, others with mirrored transfer patterns. The presence of unexplained token burns and high-volume transfers to flagged addresses further complicates the picture.

Until Fasttoken and its associated entities publish detailed wallet ownership disclosures, conduct independent audits and establish clear governance channels, the structure observed on-chain will continue to raise critical questions. This summary will be updated should verifiable disclosures or regulatory actions provide clarity. For now, the ecosystem remains highly centralised in both token supply and wallet-level activity.

Appendix: Selected screenshots and transaction logs

Due to the volume of screenshots and transaction logs involved, we have chosen not to embed them directly in this report, as doing so would make the document excessively long, big and less accessible.

1.  Main Minting Wallet

• Screenshot shows: Initial 1,000,000,000 FTN minting
• Observation: This is the genesis wallet where the total supply was created. The wallet later distributed large chunks to secondary wallets, with transfers of over 100 million FTN observed.
• Use in article: Supports claim that Fasttoken retained central control from the

2.  Wallet receiving 230,000,000 FTN

• Screenshot shows: Large inbound transactions totalling 230 million FTN.
• Observation: No major outbound activity visible. This suggests the wallet may belong to an internal treasury or private investor allocation.
• Use in article: Evidence of closed-loop, internal token

3.  Wallet holding 36,864,000 FTN

• Screenshot shows: Long transaction history (49+ pages) with consistent outgoing transfers of 499,999 FTN.
• Observation: Repeated identical transfers to multiple other addresses over hundreds of entries.
• Use in article: Supports claim of orchestrated distribution pattern rather than organic user activity.

4.  Fastex 2 Wallet Cluster

• Screenshots show: Over 139 pages of transactions; multiple wallets use the label “Fastex 2”.
• Observation: Some Fastex 2 wallets send FTN to other Fastex 2 wallets. Repetitive flow of tokens in and out suggests internal coordination.
• Use in article: Highlights the opacity of internal wallet structure and undermines decentralisation claims.

5.  Wallet receiving 14.96 million FTN

• Screenshot shows: Direct inbound transfer of nearly 15 million FTN.
• Observation: Appears to originate from an internal wallet; no outward activity logged in screenshot.
• Use in article: Points to another large internal allocation that is not visibly tied to public market activity.

6.  Alphapo Drainer Wallet

• Screenshot shows: Wallet labelled as “Alphapo Drainer” with receipt of over 173 million FTN from a Fastex-linked wallet.
• Observation: On-chain explorers associate this wallet with historical exploit
• Use in article: Raises serious governance and counterparty risk questions, though without alleging wrongdoing.

7.  Fastex Circular Transfer Patterns

• Screenshots show: Wallets with similar names sending and receiving tokens from each
• Observation: Multiple    Fastex-labelled     wallets    engaging     in    repeated     internal transactions.
• Use in article: Adds weight to the argument that Fasttoken’s on-chain activity lacks external diversity.

8.  Burn Events: 60,000,000 FTN (x2)

• Screenshot shows: Transfers of 60 million FTN twice to the null (burn)
• Observation: No announcement or audit trail provided for these No governance vote or community input confirmed.
• Use in article: Supports concern that decisions about supply reduction are made unilaterally and not transparently.

Appendix: Full list of questions submitted to Mr Vigen Badalyan on 31 July 2025

The following questions were formally submitted to Mr Vigen Badalyan, CEO of SoftConstruct and Fasttoken, on 31 July 2025. No response or acknowledgment has been received to date.

1.  Token distribution and public allocation

• What is the exact percentage of the total FTN supply that was offered to public buyers through exchange listings or public sales?
• How many tokens were distributed via retail channels compared to private placements?
• Can you confirm the recipients of the 80 million FTN allocated to Private Round 1 and the 100 million FTN allocated to Private Round 2?
• Were any of these private allocations distributed to entities owned or controlled by you, your brother Vahe Badalyan or any other senior executive at SoftConstruct or Fastex?

2.  Wallet identification and transparency

• Which wallets belong to Fasttoken, Fastex or other SoftConstruct entities?
• Why are multiple wallets labelled “Fastex 2” visible on-chain and what distinguishes them from each other?
• Can you provide a list of all official wallets controlled by the Fasttoken project team?
• Do any of the wallets labelled as “Fastex 2” interact with each other for treasury management purposes?

3.  On-chain transaction patterns

• Why do several large wallets send out identical amounts of 499,999 FTN repeatedly over time?
• Can you explain the purpose of the 36,864,000 FTN wallet that has issued hundreds of near-identical transactions?
• Are these transfers part of a marketing incentive scheme, partner distribution, or internal liquidity management?

4.  Burn activity and null address transfers

• Who authorised the transfer of 120 million FTN (in two batches of 60 million FTN) to the burn address?
• Was this token burn formally announced to the public and if so, where?
• What is the total FTN supply after these burns?
• Were these burn events conducted under a governance vote or unilateral internal decision?

5.  Exchange listings and liquidity

• Why is most of the trading volume for FTN concentrated on Fastex, a platform owned by the same group behind the token?
• How much of the reported liquidity is held or backed by entities within your corporate structure?
• Can you provide a breakdown of which exchanges currently list FTN and the volume split between them?

6.  Connection to Alphapo and related wallets

• Why does a wallet labelled “Alphapo Drainer” on multiple explorers show receipt of 173 million FTN from a wallet associated with Fastex?
• Has Fasttoken or any affiliated entity ever had a commercial or technical relationship with Alphapo?
• Do you deny any link between the above-mentioned wallet and your team?

7.  Governance, audits and oversight

• Has Fasttoken been independently audited by a third party for smart contract safety and wallet control?
• If so, where can the audit results be accessed?
• Has the token ever undergone a transparency report for token distribution and insider holdings?
• Are there governance mechanisms in place to prevent centralisation of decision- making or asset movement?

8.  Organisational clarity

• Who ultimately controls the FTN treasury?
• What role do you and Vahe Badalyan hold in relation to FTN decision-making?
• How is Fasttoken separated, if at all, from SoftConstruct’s broader business operations?
• Have any of the early recipients of large token allocations sold off their holdings? If so, where?

Closing statement submitted with the questions:

We have taken considerable care to ensure the accuracy of our on-chain observations and corporate findings. However, to provide a balanced and fair narrative, we now invite you to respond to the above questions. If no reply is received, we will proceed with publication of our findings as part of a five-part investigative series covering Fasttoken, wallet analysis, insider involvement and governance concerns. We will continue to update the articles should a formal statement be received.

FAQs

What is Fasttoken?
Fasttoken (FTN) is a cryptocurrency launched by SoftConstruct, designed for digital payments, Web3 gaming, and other blockchain-based applications.

Who controls Fasttoken?
Evidence suggests that the majority of FTN tokens are controlled by a small group of insiders, including the Badalyan brothers and affiliated SoftConstruct entities.

How much of Fasttoken was available to the public?
Only 1% of the total 1 billion FTN tokens were sold to public participants during the official launch, despite claims of decentralisation.

Are Fasttoken wallets decentralised?
On-chain analysis shows that token activity is concentrated in a few wallets, many of which are internally managed by Fastex and SoftConstruct affiliates.

Does Fasttoken have a governance structure?
No public governance mechanism, DAO, or voting process has been established, despite claims of decentralised decision-making.

What about token vesting schedules?
Although vesting periods are mentioned in tokenomics, on-chain data shows no enforced restrictions, allowing large holders early access to liquidity.

Is Fasttoken’s liquidity genuine?
Liquidity appears concentrated on the Fastex Exchange, a platform owned by the same group, raising concerns over artificial volume and market control.

Are there audits for Fasttoken?
No formal audit reports have been published, and token allocations, transfers, and treasury movements lack external verification.

How transparent is Fasttoken’s treasury?
Treasury operations are opaque, with no public reporting, wallet tagging, or clear policies on how funds are allocated or used.

What are the risks for public investors?
Due to centralised control, selective access, and limited governance, retail participants face potential disadvantage, reduced influence, and structural risks.