Cedric Pietersz and the Stalled Gambling Reform in Curaçao

A licence to delay: Is Cedric Pietersz the real bottleneck in Curaçao’s gambling reform?
When the Curaçao government promised sweeping regulatory reform to clean up its notorious online gambling sector, many believed it was the beginning of a new chapter. Yet nearly two years later, questions continue to mount about the pace, transparency and credibility of the so-called reform process. At the centre of this regulatory fog sits Cedric Pietersz, Managing Director of the Gaming Control Board (CGA), now the Curaçao Gaming Authority (CGA) and a figure whose statements increasingly fail to match on-the-ground realities.
While the Finance Ministry’s Minister Javier Silvania has drawn most of the public criticism for the LOK’s failures, industry insiders and legal analysts are beginning to look more closely at the executive charged with actually implementing the reforms: Pietersz.
From optimism to backlog
Initially introduced as a major clean-up effort, the National Ordinance for Games of Chance (LOK) was meant to replace the outdated master licence model that allowed shell companies to operate thousands of gambling sites without scrutiny. Under the new system, the CGA would assess applications directly and issue sub-licences only to those meeting enhanced due diligence requirements.
Pietersz publicly embraced this change, telling media outlets in 2024 that the CGA aimed to process licences within eight weeks and that infrastructure would be scaled to accommodate surging interest. However, even by mid-year, it became clear that this optimism was wildly misplaced.
In August 2024, Pietersz admitted that the CGA was still processing only 10 applications per week, despite having received nearly 1,000 applications in the first half of the year. Internal targets to scale up to 20 or 30 applications weekly were floated, but no evidence emerged that such improvements were ever achieved.
Blaming the applicants
Rather than acknowledging systemic underperformance within the regulator, Pietersz placed blame squarely on the industry. In multiple interviews, he claimed that low-quality applications were to blame for delays. According to him, applicants submitted incomplete documentation or failed to understand the new compliance expectations.
Yet this narrative has been criticised by multiple lawyers, operators and policymakers who say that the CGA’s guidance was vague, inconsistent and constantly changing. In fact, the licensing portal suffered frequent technical outages and applicants complained about the lack of clear timelines and a functioning communication channel.
A confidential operator letter seen by this publication stated:
“We submitted our forms according to the checklist published by the CGA. They were acknowledged, but weeks went by with no response. When we finally received feedback, new forms had been added and our application was declared ‘incomplete’. This is not a licensing process. It’s an obstacle course.”
Repeating the Ministry’s narrative
Pietersz’ public statements increasingly mirror those of Minister Silvania, raising concerns that the CGA is acting not as an independent regulator but rather as an extension of political messaging. In a press statement dated 29 November 2024, the CGA attempted to distance itself from allegations of corruption by stating that all licensing decisions are handled entirely by the Board and not by the Ministry.
But such assertions ring hollow when examined in light of Curaçao’s recent scandals.
For example, BC Game, a platform operating under a local licence, was declared bankrupt in late 2024 following player complaints and legal action initiated by the SBGOK (Foundation for the Representation of Victims of Online Gaming).
The CGA’s response? It disclaimed any responsibility, stating that player complaints are a matter for the operator.
Meanwhile, players went unpaid for months and no enforcement action was visible until the bankruptcy ruling forced a court-appointed trustee to intervene.
The CGA mirage
Under Pietersz' leadership, the GCB was transitioned into a new regulatory entity known as the Curaçao Gaming Authority (CGA). This transformation was designed to bolster international credibility and shift the jurisdiction’s image away from secrecy and grey market tolerance.
However, the CGA remains a name without substance. Despite using the label in international events, Pietersz continues to act through the old GCB structure and the supposed “independent authority” remains tied directly to the Ministry of Finance through delegated administrative functions.
Several experts have described the CGA as a “phantom authority” created for optics rather than enforcement, with no legislative autonomy or operational separation from the political figures it is meant to oversee.
Oversight in name only
As the responsible director, Pietersz holds broad powers under the 2019 Finance Ministry mandate to “grant, amend, suspend, revoke or deny licences” and to “attach conditions.” He is also in charge of investigating violations and initiating enforcement procedures against non-compliant operators.
Yet despite this authority, enforcement appears largely non-existent. Curaçao-licensed operators have been repeatedly fined in European markets for targeting players without local licences. Among them, BG Game was hit with an €840,000 penalty in the Netherlands in October 2024.
The CGA responded by stating it lacked jurisdiction over foreign violations and would only act upon formal decisions by foreign regulators. But this hands-off approach contradicts best practices in regulatory cooperation and demonstrates a wilful lack of cross-border coordination.
As one senior Dutch regulator commented anonymously:
“Curaçao could ask for proof, initiate its own proceedings or at least suspend licences when violations are proven. But they do nothing unless forced. That’s not regulation. That’s complicity.”
Obscuring the CGA’s true role
Perhaps most problematic is the way Pietersz has tried to internationalise the CGA’s image while avoiding transparency at home. The GCB/CGA has become a member of various international responsible gambling associations and hosted high-profile seminars, while offering no public register of licence holders (except for the whitelist which holds no real data), no annual enforcement reports and no published sanctions.
The CGA has also aligned itself with questionable third-party organisations, including companies with a direct interest in maintaining Curaçao’s weak regulatory perimeter. For example, player complaints filed with international watchdogs such as Casino Guru and AskGamblers continue to go unresolved due to the absence of mandatory Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), even though ADR was promised under the new system.
Pietersz has said that ADR will become mandatory, but has failed to implement it more than 18 months after the reform was announced.
The illusion of reform
At its core, Cedric Pietersz’ leadership represents a contradiction. On the one hand, he claims to be modernising the jurisdiction and defending the integrity of the licensing process. On the other, his agency fails to publish even basic statistics on approvals, denials or revocations.
What lies ahead?
With the final master licence expired in January 2025, the credibility of the CGA will be tested. If Pietersz fails to enforce a mandatory transition to licensing under the new LOK framework, international observers may conclude that Curaçao’s reform is nothing more than a public relations exercise.
The European Commission has already warned offshore jurisdictions that tolerate grey-market activity and fail to enforce licensing criteria may face regulatory retaliation. Curaçao remains on multiple financial watchlists and unless enforcement begins in earnest, the CGA’s membership in international bodies may soon be reconsidered.
Reform is dead in the water if Cedric Pietersz remains at the helm!
At this stage in the process, few stakeholders continue to believe that Curaçao’s gambling reform is being driven by regulatory priorities. Instead, it is becoming increasingly clear that Cedric Pietersz has become a key facilitator of stagnation. His administration offers polished international presentations, glossy membership logos and vague reassurances, but no data, no public enforcement activity and no meaningful regulatory muscle.
The contrast between stated intent and actual performance is impossible to ignore. While Pietersz repeatedly stresses integrity, his office has failed to publish basic operational metrics. While he claims independence from the Finance Ministry, his talking points are indistinguishable from those of Minister Silvania. And while he pledges transparency, the CGA operates with less visibility than many of the operators it claims to supervise.
Far from guiding Curaçao into a new era of regulatory credibility, Pietersz has instead prolonged the culture of unaccountability that made the island a haven for grey-market gambling for over two decades. Under his leadership, the supposed reforms have failed to enforce a single high-profile revocation, failed to sanction repeat offenders and failed to meet the expectations of players, regulators and legislators abroad.
This is not a matter of capacity. It is a matter of leadership.
With the legacy master licences now expired and the reform window quickly closing, there is a narrow opportunity for Curaçao to recover. That opportunity, however, will almost certainly be lost unless the government undertakes a serious restructuring of its regulatory leadership. International credibility cannot be earned through cosmetic changes. It must be built through enforcement, disclosure and an unwavering commitment to impartial oversight.
If the CGA wishes to be taken seriously on the world stage, it needs to prove that its authority is real. That starts with replacing the figures who have presided over inaction and who, through either mismanagement or misplaced loyalties, continue to shield Curaçao’s licensing regime from the very reforms they were hired to implement.
Until then, reform will remain a word used for marketing, not for governance. And Cedric Pietersz will remain the symbol of a promise unkept.
FAQs
What is the Curaçao Gaming Authority (CGA)?
The CGA is the regulatory body overseeing Curaçao’s gambling sector, responsible for licensing, enforcement, and compliance under the LOK framework.
Who is Cedric Pietersz?
Cedric Pietersz is the Managing Director of the CGA, tasked with implementing Curaçao’s gambling reforms but criticized for delays and lack of enforcement.
What is the National Ordinance for Games of Chance (LOK)?
LOK is Curaçao’s updated gambling regulation replacing the old master licence system to increase oversight, due diligence, and accountability for operators.
Why are Curaçao’s gambling reforms delayed?
Delays are attributed to administrative inefficiency, unclear guidance, technical issues, and a backlog of nearly 1,000 licence applications.
Has the CGA enforced compliance against non-compliant operators?
No significant enforcement has occurred; Curaçao-licensed operators continue to face fines abroad while local oversight remains minimal.
What is the criticism against Cedric Pietersz?
Critics argue Pietersz mirrors political narratives, offers international PR optics over substance, and fails to enforce licensing or provide transparency.
Why is Curaçao’s gambling reform considered a “mirage”?
The CGA operates with limited independence, publishes minimal operational data, and has yet to implement promised mechanisms like mandatory ADR.
How does Curaçao’s reform affect international credibility?
Poor enforcement and grey-market tolerance risk scrutiny from European regulators and could lead to financial and regulatory consequences.
What was promised under Curaçao’s licensing reforms?
The reforms promised faster licensing, transparency, independent oversight, enhanced due diligence, and robust enforcement of gaming standards.
What needs to happen for Curaçao’s gambling reform to succeed?
The government must restructure regulatory leadership, enforce licensing and compliance, publish data, and establish true independence from political influence.
Michael
With nearly 30 years in corporate services and investigative journalism, I head TRIDER.UK, specializing in deep-dive research into gaming and finance. As Editor of Malta Media, I deliver sharp investigative coverage of iGaming and financial services. My experience also includes leading corporate formations and navigating complex international business structures.
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